The Authentica Habita is a famous constitution (imperial law) attributed to Emperor Frederick I Barbarossa and typically dated around 1158. Often considered one of the earliest forms of legal protection for scholars and university students in Europe, this text granted them specific privileges as they traveled for their studies. Probably issued in 1158 at Roncaglia, it holds historical significance as a foundational document for academic freedom.
The Authentica Habita emerged at a time when scholars traveled frequently between cities, often facing local hostilities and risks as foreigners. Seeking to strengthen his own imperial authority, Frederick Barbarossa granted this privilege to foster a loyal, educated elite within the Empire. This legislation protected scholars from harm and unjust treatment by granting them specific rights. It prohibited the application of the so-called rappresaglia, a form of collective liability common in medieval cities that that allowed anyone to be held accountable for the debts of another individual from the same natio. Additionally, the document granted students the right to be judged by their own professor or by the bishop, rather than by the ordinary judge. Thus, the Habita ensured that scholars could live and study without fear of interference or injury from local authorities, with these privileges extending to their messengers or representatives.
This law represented an essential step in the institutionalization of universities in Europe, implicitly recognising the existence of these communities and establishing the concept of a protected scholarly community with privileges under imperial law.
The Authenticae Codicis are brief extracts from imperial constitutions inserted into Justinian’s Code by medieval jurists. The Authentica Habita was added to the Code in Book 4, Title 13, after Law 5.
Auth. Habita, post L. Ex patroni, C. Ne filius pro patre (C. 4, 14, 5), in Codicis Iustiniani Ex Repetita Praelectione Libri Novem Priores, Lugduni, Apud Hugonem a Porta, 1560.
Titulus XIII.
Ne filius pro patre, vel pater pro filio emancipato, vel libertus pro patrono, vel servus pro domino conveniatur
Lex V.
Ex patroni, vel domini, contractu liberti vel servi conveniri non possunt.
Authentica.
Habita super hoc diligenti inquisitione Episcoporum, Abbatum, ducum et omnium iudicum, et aliorum procerum sacri nostri palatii examinatione, omnibus qui causa studiorum pregrinantur scholaribus, et maxime divinarum atque sacrarum legum professoribus hoc nostrae pietatis beneficium indulgemus, ut ad loca, in quibus literarum exercentur studia tam ipsi, quam eorum nuntii veniant, et in eis secure habitent.
Dignum namque existimamus, ut cum omnes bona facientes, nostram laudem et protectionem omnimodo mereantur, quorum scientia totus illuminatur mundus, et ad obediendum Deo et nobis eius ministris vita subiectorum informatur, quadam speciali dilectione eos ab omni iniuria defendamus.
Quis enim eorum non misereatur, qui amore scientiae exules facti, de divitibus pauperes, semetipsos exinaniunt, vitam suam multis periculis exponunt, et a vilissimis hominibus (quod graviter ferendum est) corporales iniurias sine causa perferunt?
Hic igitur generali, et in perpetuum valitura lege decernimus, ut nullus de caetero tam audax inveniatur, qui aliquam scholaribus iniuriam inferre praesumat, nec ob alterius cuiuscunque provinciae delictum sive debitum (quod aliquando ex perversa consuetudine factum audivimus) aliquod damnum eid inferat, scitùris huiusmodi sacrae constitutionis temeratoribus, et etiam ipsis locorum rectoribus, qui hoc vindicare neglexerint, restitutionem rerum ablatarum ab omnibus exigendam in quadruplum: notaque infamiae eis ipso iure irroganda, dignitate sua se cariturus in perpetuum.
Verum tamen si litem eis quispiam super aliquo negotio movere voluerit: huius rei optione data scholaribus, eos coram domino vel magistro suo, vel ipsius civitatis Episcopo, quibus hanc iurisdictionem dedimus conveniat.
Qui vero ad alium iudicem eos trahere tentaverit: etiam si causa iustissima fuerit, a tali conamine cadat. Hanc autem legem inter imperiales constitutiones, scilicet sub titulo Ne filius pro patre etc. inseri iussimus.
Comprehension
a. What are the primary legal protections granted to scholars under the Authentica Habita?
b. How did this law address the issue of rappresaglia, and why was it significant for traveling scholars?
c. Where in Justinian’s Code was the Authentica Habita inserted, and what significance did this placement have?
d. According to the Authentica Habita, who had jurisdiction over legal disputes involving scholars?
The Concordia Discordantium Canonum, also known as Decretum Gratiani, is one of the foundational texts of medieval canon law. Compiled around 1140 by Gratian, possibly a camaldolese monk, active in Bologna, the Decretum represents a monumental effort to bring coherence to the vast and fragmented body of canon law. By synthesizing and organizing canon law sources, Gratian established the foundation for what would become the Corpus Iuris Canonici, the authoritative body of medieval canon law.
In this passage, Gratian introduces the concepts of ius naturale (natural law) and ius humanum (human law). Natural law, as described here, is universal and divine, encompassing moral principles found in both the Old Testament and the New Testament. Gratian cites the Gospel and Isidore of Seville’s Etymologies to illustrate that natural law is God-given and governs humanity by instructing people to treat others as they themselves would like to be treated. This law is immutable, inherent in nature, and applies to all humans regardless of cultural differences.
In contrast, ius humanum is based on human customs, varying across different societies and communities. Human law, as Gratian suggests, is rooted in societal norms and traditions, which can differ from one people to another. By comparing divine and human law – fas and ius – he highlights that certain actions may be morally permissible (such as walking across another’s field) under natural law but restricted under human law.
Gratian’s work influenced the development of both canon and secular law, as jurists and theologians in the 12th and 13th centuries further explored the relationship between spiritual and secular authority. The Decretum became an indispensable text for the study of law in medieval universities, and its principles on natural law would later shape Western legal thought well into the early modern period.
C. Omnes leges (c.1, D. 1), Decretum Gratiani, emendatum et notationibus illustratum, una cum glossis, Gregorii XIII Pont. Max. iussu editum, Romae, In Aedibus Populi Romani, 1582, coll. 1-2.
(Dictum Gratiani)
Humanum genus duobus regitur, naturali videlicet iure, et moribus. Ius naturale est, quod in lege et Evangelio continetur: quo quisque iubetur alii facere, quod sibi vult fieri; et prohibetur alii inferre, quod sibi nolit fieri. Unde Christus in Evangelio: [Omnia quaecumque vultis ut faciant vobis homines, et vos eadem facite illis. Haec est enim lex et propheta.]
Hinc Isidorus in quinto lib. Etymologiarum. c. 2. ait.
D. I, c. I
Omnes leges aut divinae sunt, aut humanae. Divinae natura, humanae moribus constant: ideoque hae discrepant quoniam aliae aliis gentibus placent. Fas lex divina est: ius lex humana. Transire per agrum alienum fas est, ius non est.
Comprehension
a. According to Gratian, what is the basis of natural law, and what examples does he use to explain its universal and divine nature?
b. Why is the Decretum Gratiani considered a foundational text for medieval canon law, and how did its principles influence later legal thought?
The excerpt provided is taken from the opening fragment of Justinian’s Digest (or Pandects), specifically D. 1, 1, 1. This text forms part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the collection of Roman law compiled under emperor Justinian I in the 6th century AD. The Digest itself is a monumental compilation of Roman jurisprudence, consisting of 50 books divided into titles.
This particular fragment lays the groundwork for understanding the nature and divisions of law in the Roman legal tradition. It begins with the etymology of the term ius (law), connecting it to iustitia (justice), and introduces the famous definition of law by the Roman jurist Celsus: “Law is the art of the good and the equitable”. This passage also aligns the study of law with the pursuit of true philosophy, emphasizing a commitment to equity and morality as essential to the legal profession. It portrays the discipline of law as aspiring to cultivate a deeper understanding of what is just and good, positioning jurists as “priests” of these principles.
The text defines natural law as a universal principle inherent in all living beings, shared by humans and animals alike. Actions like marriage, procreation, and nurturing are portrayed as universal and instinctive expressions of this law. By contrast, the ius gentium governs human interactions and is distinct from natural law, applying exclusively to relations among human societies.
Historically, this fragment serves as a cornerstone for the teaching of Roman law in the medieval and early modern periods, when the Corpus Iuris Civilis became the basis of legal education in Europe. It reflects the Roman understanding of law as both a practical and moral discipline, a perspective that significantly influenced the development of European legal systems and the scholastic approach to law. The universal applicability of natural law and the distinction between laws based on human constructs versus innate principles continue to resonate in contemporary discussions of jurisprudence, ethics, and human rights.
L. Iuri operam, De iustitia et iure (D. 1, 1, 1), in Digestum Vetus Pandectarum Iuris Civilis tomus primus, Lugduni, Apud Hugonem a Porta, 1560, coll. 11-13.
LEX I.
Iuri operam daturum prius nosse oportet unde nomen iuris descendat. Est autem ius a iustitia appellatum. Nam ut eleganter Celsus definit, Ius est ars boni et aequi: cuius merito quis nos sacerdotes appellet. Iustitiam nanque còlimus, et boni et aequi notitiam profitèmur, aequum ab iniquo separantes, licitum ab illicito discernentes: bonos non solum metu poenarum, verum etiam praemiorum quoque exhortatione efficere cupientes: veram (nisi fallor) philosophiam, non simulatam affectantes.
Huius studii duae sunt positiones, publicum et privatum. Publicum ius est quod ad statum rei Romanae spectat: Privatum, quod ad singulorum utilitatem. Sunt enim quaedam publice utilia, quaedam privatim. Publicum ius in sacris, in sacerdotibus, in magistratibus consistit. Privatum ius tripertitum est. collectum enim est ex naturalibus praeceptis, aut gentium, aut civilibus. Ius naturale est quod natura omnia animalia docuit. Nam ius istud non solius humani generis proprium, sed omnium animalium quae terra, marique nascuntur avium quoque commune est. Hinc descendit maris atque foeminae coniugatio, quam nos matrimonium appellamus: hinc liberorum procreatio, hinc educatio. Videmus etenim caetera quoque animalia, feras etiam, istius iuris peritia censeri. Ius gentium est, quo gentes humanae utuntur. Quod a naturali recedere, inde licet facile intelligere: quia illud omnibus animalibus, hoc solis hominibus inter se commune est.
Comprehension
a. Why does the text say that law (ius) comes from justice (iustitia), and what does this connection suggest about the role of jurists?
b. How does the text describe the difference between natural law (ius naturale) and the law of nations (ius gentium)?
c. In what ways does the portrayal of jurists as “priests” of justice and law elevate the discipline of law to a moral and philosophical practice, rather than merely a technical or administrative one?
The Lex Omnes Populi is the ninth fragment of the opening title of Justinian’s Digest, De iustitia et iure. It articulates the distinction between ius civile, understood as the legal system specific to individual entities, and ius gentium (law of nations), a body of law derived from natural reason and shared universally among all peoples. The text highlights that while ius civile governs particular communities, ius gentium encompasses principles common to human societies. This fragment, Lex Omnes Populi (D. 1, 1, 9), provides a theoretical foundation for discussions about the legitimacy of legal pluralism within the framework of the Holy Roman Empire. By distinguishing between ius civile, the law specific to individual communities, and ius gentium, the universal principles shared across societies, it establishes a dual structure that recognizes the coexistence of localized legal systems (ius proprium) alongside overarching norms derived from natural reason (ius commune). This distinction allowed medieval jurists to conceptualize a legal and political order where diverse entities could create and enforce their own rules – seen as legitimate expressions of ius civile – provided they did not contravene the universal principles of ius commune.
L. Omnes Populi, De iustitia et iure (D. 1, 1, 9), in Digestum Vetus Pandectarum Iuris Civilis tomus primus, Lugduni, Apud Hugonem a Porta, 1560, col. 16.
LEX IX.
Omnes populi qui legibus et moribus reguntur, partim suo proprio, partim communi omnium hominum iure utuntur. Nam quod quisque populus ipse sibi ius constituit, id ipsius civitatis proprium est: vocaturque ius civile, quasi ius proprium ipsius civitatis. Quod vero naturalis ratio inter omnes homines constituit, id apud omnes peraeque custodìtur: vocaturque ius gentium, quasi quo iure omnes gentes utantur.
Comprehension
a. How does the Lex Omnes Populi distinguish between ius civile and ius gentium, and what does this distinction imply about the coexistence of local and universal legal systems?
This passage is taken from the opening of Justinian’s Institutes (Inst. 1,1), part of the Corpus Iuris Civilis, the monumental compilation of Roman law completed in the 6th century AD under Emperor Justinian I. The Institutes were conceived as a legal textbook, designed to introduce students to the principles of Roman law. Its pedagogical aim is reflected in the text’s emphasis on clarity, gradual learning, and the avoidance of overwhelming complexity in legal education. However, the Institutes constitute – quite unprecedentedly – positive law.
The passage contains a fragment from Ulpian which defines justice as the constant and perpetual will to give each person their due, and legal knowledge (iuris prudentia) as the understanding of divine and human matters, as well as the discernment of what is just and unjust. It outlines the basic precepts of law: to live honorably, to harm no one, and to give each their due.
The gloss on the word Iustitia offers a rich illustration of how medieval jurists interpreted and built on Roman law. Expanding upon Ulpian’s definition of justice – “the constant and perpetual will to give each person their due” – Accursius introduced a perspective that distinguished between divine and human justice. Divine justice, as explored in the gloss, is presented as an ideal that surpasses the limitations of human understanding. Biblical and theological examples, such as the parable of the laborers in the vineyard (Matthew 20:1–16), are used to illustrate how God’s justice operates according to principles that may appear unfair by human standards but are praised for their ultimate equity and generosity. In contrast, human justice is acknowledged as inherently flawed and limited, subject to the imperfections of human nature.
The gloss also engages with classical philosophical definitions of justice, such as Cicero’s view of justice as the habitus animi which ensures communal utility, and Placentinus’s conception of justice as a virtue guiding action where reason alone may not suffice.
All these ideas, incorporated into the Corpus Iuris Civilis, profoundly influenced the development of the Western legal tradition.
§. Iustitia, Inst., De iustitia et iure (Inst. 1, 1, §1), in Volumen, Lugduni, Apud Hugonem a Porta, 1558, coll. 9-11.
Inst. 1,1
Iustitia est constans et perpetua voluntas ius suum unicuique tribuens. Iuris prudentia est divinarum atque humanarum rerum notitia, iusti atque iniusti scientia. His igitur generaliter cognitis, et incipientibus nobis exponere iura Populi Romani, ita videntur posse tradi comodissime, si primo levi ac simplici via, post deinde diligentissima atque exactissima interpretatione singula tradantur. Alioqui si statim ab initio rudem adhuc, et infirmum animum studiosi, multitudine ac varietate rerum oneraverimus: duorum alterum, aut desertorem studiorum efficiemus, aut cum magno labore, saepe etiam cum diffidentia (quae plerunque iuvenes avertit) serius ad id perducemus, ad quod leviore via ductus, sine magno labore et sine ulla diffidentia, maturius perduci potuisset.
Iuris praecepta sunt haec, Honeste vivere, Alterum non laedere, suum cuique tribuere.
Huius studii duae sunt positiones: publicum et privatum. Publicum ius est, quod ad statum rei romanae spectat. Privatum est, quod ad singulorum utilitatem pertinet. Dicendum est igitur, de iure privato, quod tripertitum est. est enim ex naturalibus praeceptis, aut gentium, aut civilibus.
Glossa «Iustitia»
a Iustitia] Haec iustitia definitio potest intelligi de divina iustitia quasi dicat Divina iustitia est voluntas constans, et perpetua et cetera et secundum hoc, haec verba in ea posita sunt plana. Sed nonne iniustum fuit, quod tantum datum fuit mercenario in sero venienti, quantum illi, qui mane venerat: quod tamen dei iustitia laudat, ut ff. de annuis legatis l. ii. et de verborum significatione l. ii. §. cuiusque. Respondit illud divinum vel mystice, vel allegorice debet intelligi quasi dicat tantum habebit de paradiso ille, qui decedit in hoc ultimo seculo, si faciat bonum: quantum ille, qui decesserit in primo seculo [ut patet in his versibus: Vinea culta fuit: cultores praemia quaerunt. Non labor aequalis: aequalia dona fuerunt. Sic deus ostendit, quod quandocunque venimus: Arripiamus iter, certi de munere simus.] Vel dic secundum Ioan. quod de fragili hominis iustitia, loquitur quasi dicat iustitia humana, vel quae est in homine, est voluntas constans et cetera et secundum hoc illa duo verba, constans, et perpetua, abiiciuntur extra: quia homini non possunt convenire: cum scriptum sit, quod septies in die cadit iustus. Et illud: Nunquam in eodem statu permanet: ut in authen. de non ali. aut. permut. §. ut autem col. Ii. Item quod in fine dicit, suum unicuique tribuens: intellige quantum ad affectionem: quia ad actum non potest, quasi dicat habens affectum tribuendi: sicut supra in rubrica proemii, dicitur de Augusto sic et de matrimonio: quod est individuum: ut infra de pat. Pot. in principio licet interdum dividatur: ut patet C. de repu. l. consensu. Vel tertio expone, ut in summa huius tituli, ut voluntas, id est, mens: constans, id est, bonum quasi habitus mentis bonus. Sed Tullius sic definit: iustitia est habitus animi, communi utilitate servata, suam cuilibet tribuens dignitatem. Sed secundum Placentinus Iustitia est virtus, quae plurimum potest in iis, quae minimum possunt. Vel prout, ergo credo, Iustitia est animi congrua dispositio, in singulis rebus recte diiudicans. Ac.
Comprehension
a. What pedagogical principles are emphasized in the Institutes’ introduction, and how are these principles designed to aid students of Roman law?
b. How do the glossators use theological and philosophical examples to expand and reinterpret Ulpian’s definition of justice in the context of medieval legal thought?
The Liber Augustalis, also known as the Constitutiones Regni Siciliae, is a 13th-century compilation promulgated by Frederick II in 1231 at Melfi, and therefore also called the Constitutions of Melfi. Compiled by Pier Delle Vigne and Giacomo of Capua, the Liber consists mainly of Frederick’s constitutions and of part of the previous norman legislation contained in the Assisae of Roger II. The Constitutiones consist of 255 chapters divided into three books, dedicated to public law, judicial procedure, feudal, private and criminal law.
Frederick was emperor of the Holy Roman Empire, but he meant it to be valid only for the Kingdom of Sicily. In spite of this, the text contains principles and references that seem to reveal a wider aspiration, the universal aspiration that characterised Frederick’s reign, who was at the same time emperor and king.
Marino da Caramanico, a notable jurist of Frederick’s court, is credited with writing the prologue to this work. Marino demonstrates not only a deep engagement with the legal and political issues of his time but also a forward-looking vision of social and political phenomena. Francesco Calasso, a celebrated legal historian, recognized the significance of this text and viewed it as an articulation of a new conception of sovereignty, signaling a departure from early medieval ideas. In his Prohemium, Marino emphasizes the potestas plena et rotunda (complete and autonomous authority) of the King of Sicily, rejecting the notion of universal imperial supremacy. He asserts that the Sicilian kingdom is exemptum ab imperio (exempt from imperial authority) and bases this autonomy on the contractual relationship of obedience between the ruler and his subjects. His Prohemium breaks with medieval frameworks of subordination to universal authorities, whether imperial or papal, instead positioning the Sicilian monarchy as an autonomous and self-sufficient legal entity.
From Francesco Calasso, I glossatori e la teoria della sovranità. Studio di diritto comune pubblico, Milano, Giuffré, 1957, p. 175-ss.
Prohemium
Liber iste ideo Constitutio, seu Constitutionum dicitur, quod in eo redacta sunt principum placita, que constitutiones vulgo dicuntur, ut ff., De constitutionibus principum, l. i., § Hec sunt. Principum, inquam, utpote quondam domini Frederici secundi, olim imperatoris, tunc regis Sicilie, qui librum istum compilari et publicari fecit antequam imperio privaretur et regno, nec non aliorum precedentium Sicilie regnum, ut infra in fine prohemii. Hec autem principalis constitutio lex est et in regno nostro Sicilie pro lege servatur, ut ff., De origine iuris, l. ii., § Itaque in civitate nostra, et Inst., De iure naturali, § Sed et quod principi. Et neminem moveat quod preallegata romana iura tantum in principe, idest romanorum imperatore obtineant, cui soli concessum est condere legem, ut in Aut., De raptis mulieribus, in principio, collat. IX, et C., De legibus et constitutionibus, l. Si imperialis, et De veteri iure enucleando, l. Tanta, circa finem. Nam ei soli concessum est condere legem, scilicet communem, ut in Aut., De instrumentorum cautela, § Quia igitur, collat. vi, in universa itaque ditione et que ascendentem videt et descendetem solem et que ex utroque latere est, idest in meridie et septentrione, ut in Aut., Ut omnes obediant iudicibus provinciarum, § Hoc considerantes, collat. v, et in omnibus insulis que usque ad ipsos oceani recessus extenduntur, ut in Aut., Ut ecclesia romana, § Quod ergo nostra, collat. ii., et in omni terra quam romanorum continet lex et catholice ecclesie sanctio, ut in Aut., De non alienandis, circa finem, collat. ii. Sed in rege libero, qui nullius alterius potestati subiectus est, idem dicimus, scilicet ut rex ipse possit condere legem, ut ff., De captivis et postliminio reversis, l. non dubito, § Liber, qualis est rex Sicilie, sicut infra subiiciemus. Ideoque audacter dicimus, ut videlicet inter subditos regni sui possit rex consitutionem facere, et contrariam etiam communi romano iuri constituere legem, ut patet ff., De captivis et postliminio reversis, l. Postliminium, in principio. Cum et constitutio dicatur, quam rex vel imperator constituit, ut in Decretis, dist. ii., c. Constitutio. Quid enim aliud est lex quam rex? ut in lege greca ff., De legibus et senatusconsultis, l. Lex est omnium rex. Solemus enim dicere: novus rex, nova lex, ut infra in l. ultima huius libri, Ad laudem etc. Unde sicut imperatoris, ita regis est proprium condere legem. Nimirum quisque namque populus cuiuscumque scilicet municipii vel civitatis potest sibi legem propriam facere, sicut est lex illa saltim data de qua fit mentio C. De noxalibus actionibus, l. Si servi vestri, que municipalis lex vocatur ius civile, quasi ius proprium civitatis ipsius, ut ff., De iustitia et iure, l. Omnes populi.
Comprehension
a. What distinction does the source make between the king’s ability to legislate and the traditional role of the Roman emperor in creating laws?
b. How does the source use references to Roman legal texts to support the claim of the Sicilian king’s legislative autonomy?
